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Abstract
In the swap game (SG) selfish players, each of which is associated to a vertex, form
a graph by edge swaps, i.e., a player changes its strategy by simultaneously removing an
adjacent edge and forming a new edge (Alon et al., 2013). The cost of a player considers
the average distance to all other players or the maximum distance to other players. Any
SG by n players starting from a tree converges to an equilibrium with a constant Price
of Anarchy (PoA) within O(n3) edge swaps (Lenzner, 2011). We focus on SGs where
each player knows the subgraph induced by players within distance k. Therefore, each
player cannot compute its cost nor a best response. We first consider pessimistic players
who consider the worst-case global graph. We show that any SG starting from a tree
(i) always converges to an equilibrium within O(n3) edge swaps irrespective of the value
of k, (ii) the PoA is Θ(n) for k = 1, 2, 3, and (iii) the PoA is constant for k ≥ 4. We
then introduce weakly pessimistic players and optimistic players and show that these less
pessimistic players achieve constant PoA for k ≤ 3 at the cost of best response cycles.
Keyword: Network creation game, local information, price of anarchy, dynamics.
1 Introduction
Static and dynamic properties of networks not controlled by any centralized authority attracts
much attention in last two decades as self-organizing large-scale networks play a critical role
in a variety of information systems, for example, the Internet, Peer-to-Peer networks, ad-hoc
networks, wireless sensor networks, social networks, viral networks, and so on. In these net-
works, participants selfishly and rationally change a part of the network structure to minimize
their cost and maximize their gain. Controlling such networks is essentially impossible and
many theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted; stochastic network construc-
tion models such as the Baraba´siAlbert model were proposed, and key structural properties
such as the small world networks [23] and the scale-free networks [3] have been discovered.
Stochastic communication models such as the voting models [10, 21], the random phone call
model [14], and the rewiring model [12] were proposed and many phase transition phenomena
have been reported. Many problems related to broadcasting, gossiping, and viral marketing
were also proposed [4, 11, 16].
In this paper, we take a game-theoretic approach to analyze dynamics and efficiency of the
network structure resulting from local reconstruction by selfish agents. The network creation
game (NCG) considers n players forming a network [13]. Each player is associated with a
vertex of the network, can construct a communication edge connecting itself to another player
at the cost of α, and can remove an adjacent edge for free. The cost of a player is the sum
of the construction cost for edges and the communication cost, which is the sum of distances
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to all other players in the current network, i.e., the average distance to other players. Each
player selfishly changes its strategy to minimize its cost and the social cost of a network is
the sum of all players’ costs. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of NCG is constant for almost all
values of α [1, 9, 18, 19], yet the PoA is not known for some values of α. However, computing
the best response in NCG is NP-hard [13], and this fact makes the NCG unrealistic in large-
scale networks. The NCG with another type of communication cost is proposed in [9], where
the cost of a player is the maximum distance to other players. We call this game the Max
Network Creation Game (MAX-NCG) and the original NCG the Sum Network Creation
Game (SUM-NCG). However, the SUM-NCG and the MAX-NCG ignores one of the most
critical limitations in large-scale networks; each player cannot obtain “global” information.
This type of locality is a fundamental limitation in distributed computing [22], although
players can neither compute its cost nor the best response without global information.
In this paper, we focus on games in such a distributed environment where each player
cannot obtain the current strategy of all players nor have enough local memory to store the
global information. Rather, players can access only local information. The NCG by players
with local information is first proposed in [6]. Each player can observe a subgraph of the
current graph induced by the players within distance k. We call this information the k-local
information. The players are pessimistic in the sense that they consider the worst-case global
graph when they examine a new strategy. Computing the best response for MAX-NCG is
still NP-hard because k-local information may contain the entire network. For small k, more
specifically, for 1 ≤ k ≤ α+1, PoA = Ω( n1+α ) for MAX-NCG and for k ≤ c 3
√
α PoA = Ω(n/k)
for SUM-NCG. These results contrast global information with local information. The SUM-
NCG and MAX-NCG by players with global trace-route based information is proposed, yet
PoA = Θ(n) for some values of α [5]. The NCG for more powerful players with k-local
information is considered in [8], where the players can probe the cost of a new strategy.
Computing the best response is NP-hard for any k ≥ 1 while there exists tree equilibrium
that achieves PoA = O(log n) and PoA = Ω( lognk ) for 2 ≤ k ≤ log n and PoA = Θ(n) for
k = 1. For non-tree networks, depending on the values of α and k, we have PoA = O(n).
The swap game (SG) restricts strategy changes to edge swaps, i.e., simultaneously remov-
ing an edge and creating a new edge [2]. Thus, any strategy change does not change the
number of edges in the network and the best response can be computed in polynomial time.
Additionally, when we restrict initial networks to trees, a star achieves the minimum social
cost. Above mentioned cost functions were adopted and these SGs are called the SUM-SG
and the MAX-SG, respectively. The aim of SG is to omit parameter α from NCG with
keeping the essence of NCG. The authors showed that the diameter of a tree equilibrium
is two for the SUM-SG and at most three for the MAX-SG, while there exists an equilib-
rium with a large diameter in general networks. Thus, PoA of a tree equilibrium is always
constant. Moreover, any SUM-SG and MAX-SG starting from a tree converges to an equilib-
rium within O(n3) edge swaps while they admit best response cycles starting from a general
graph [15, 17]. Consequently, local search at players with global information achieves efficient
network construction for initial tree networks. The SUM-SG and MAX-SG with “powerful”
players with k-local information is investigated in [8]. For k ≥ 2, the SUM-SG and MAX-SG
starting from general networks admits best response cycles while convergence within O(n3)
moves is guaranteed for tree networks. However, to the best of our knowledge, SG with
k-local information has not been considered.
1.1 Our results
In this paper, we investigate the convergence property and PoA of SGs by players with local
information. First, we consider pessimistic players and demonstrate that starting from an
initial tree, any SUM-SG and MAX-SG converge to an equilibrium within O(n3) edge swaps
in the same manner as [17], i.e., we present a generalized ordinal potential function for the
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two games. We also show that convergence from a general network is not always guaranteed.
Then, we present a clear phase transition phenomenon caused by the locality.
• When k = 1, 2, pessimistic players never perform any edge swap in the SUM-SG and
in MAX-SG. Any network is an equilibrium of the two games, thus PoA = Θ(n).
• When k = 3, in the SUM-SG and MAX-SG, there exists an equilibrium of diameter
Θ(n), thus PoA = Θ(n).
• When k ≥ 4, in the SUM-SG and MAX-SG the diameter of every equilibrium is con-
stant, thus PoA is constant.
We then introduce weakly-pessimistic players and optimistic players to obtain a better PoA
for k ≤ 3. A weakly pessimistic player performs an edge swap even when its cost does not
decrease. This relaxation results in a constant PoA of the MAX-SG when k = 3 at the cost
of best response cycles. An optimistic player assumes the best-case global graph for an edge
swap and this optimism results in a constant PoA of the SUM-SG and MAX-SG for any
value of k. Consequently, the combination of k-locality for k ≥ 4 and pessimism enables
distributed construction of efficient trees by selfish players.
1.2 Related works
We briefly survey existing results of the NCG and SG for players with global information.
Regarding the SUM-NCG, when α ≤ n1−ε for ε ≥ 1/ log n the PoA is O(31/ε) [9]. Thus,
when n is sufficiently large, the PoA is bound by a constant. When α > 4n+13, the PoA is at
most 3 + 2n/(2n+α) [7]. In addition, any constant upper bound of PoA for n ≤ α ≤ 4n+ 13
is not known and the best upper bound is O(2
√
lgn) [9]. If every equilibrium is a tree, then
PoA < 5 and an interesting conjecture is that every equilibrium is a tree for sufficiently large
α [13]. Regarding the MAX-NCG, the PoA is 2O(
√
lgn) and it is constant when α = O(n−1/2)
or α > 129 [19].
Regarding the SUM-SG, there exists an equilibrium with diameter 2O(
√
lgn) while the
diameter of any equilibrium is at most two (thus, a star) if an initial graph is a tree [2].
Regarding the MAX-SG, there exists an equilibrium with diameter Θ(
√
n) while the diameter
of any equilibrium is at most three if an initial graph is a tree [2].
1.3 Organization
Preliminary section introduces the SGs and pessimistic players with local information. In
the next section, we analyze the dynamics and PoA of SGs by pessimistic players. In the
following section, we introduce less pessimistic players and present best response cycles and
equilibria with small diameter. Finally, we conclude this paper with open problems.
2 Preliminaries
A swap game (SG) by players with k-local information is denoted by (G0, k), where G0 =
(V,E0) is an initial network and integer k is the size of each player’s “visibility”. G0 is a
simple undirected connected graph, where |V | = n and |E0| = m. We say u ∈ V is adjacent
to v ∈ V if edge {u, v} is an element of E. Each player is associated to a vertex in V and
the strategy of a player u ∈ V is the set of its incident edges.
Each player can change its strategy by an edge swap, i.e., removing one incident edge
and creating a new edge. Starting from G0, a sequence of edge swaps generates a network
evolution G0, G1, G2, . . ..
3
Let NG(u) be the set of adjacent vertices of u ∈ V in G and dG(u, v) be the distance
between u, v ∈ V in G. When G is not connected and v is not reachable from u, dG(u, v) =∞.
The cost of a player depends on the current graph G. We consider two different types of cost
functions, cSUM,u(G) and cMAX,u(G) defined as follows:
cSUM,u(G) =
∑
v∈V
dG(u, v)
cMAX,u(G) = max
v∈V
dG(u, v).
When G is not connected, cSUM,u(G) =∞ and cMAX,u(G) =∞. We call a swap game where
each player u uses cSUM,u the sum swap game (SUM-SG) and a swap game where each player
u uses cMAX,u the max swap game (MAX-SG). When it is clear from the context, we omit
the name of the game and use cu.
Each player u can access local information determined by G. Let VG,k(u) denote the set of
vertices within distance k from u in G (thus, the k-neighborhood of u). Player u can observe
the subgraph of G induced by VG,k(u) and we call this subgraph the view of u. We say the
information at u is k-local and we call its view the k-local information of u. We assume that
each player does not know any global information such as the values of n and m.
In a transition from Gt to Gt+1, a single player performs an edge swap. Consider the case
where a player u performs an edge swap (v, w) ∈ NGt(u)× (VGt,k(u) \ (NGt(u)∪{u})) in Gt.
We call u the moving player in Gt. The resulting graph is Gt+1 = (V,E\{{u, v}}∪{{u,w}}).
Note that the number of edges does not change in a SG.
Due to local information, each player cannot compute its current cost nor the improvement
by a strategy change. We first consider pessimistic players that consider the worst-case
improvement for each possible edge swap and select one that achieves positive improvement.
A player u is unhappy if it has an edge swap that decreases its cost in the worst-case global
graph. In other words, there exists at least one edge swap (v, w) at u that satisfies
∆u(v, w) = min
H∈Gu
(cu(H)− cu(H ′)) > 0,
where Gu is the set of simple undirected connected graphs consisting of finite number of
vertices and compatible with u’s local view, and H ′ is a graph obtained by the edge swap
(v, w) at u in H ∈ G. We assume that a moving player always performs an edge swap (v, w)
with ∆u(v, w) > 0. When every player u is not unhappy with respect to cSUM,u(G) in graph
G, we call G a sum-swap equilibrium. When every player u is not unhappy with respect to
cMAX,u(G) in graph G, we call G a max-swap equilibrium. When a graph is a sum-swap
equilibrium and a max-swap equilibrium we simply call the graph swap equilibrium.
We define the social cost SC(G) of a graph G as the sum of all players’ costs, i.e.,
SC(G) =
∑
u∈V cu(G). Let G(n,m) be the set of simple undirected connected graphs of
n players and m edges and GSUM(n,m, k) be the set of sum-swap equilibrium graphs of n
players with k-local information and m edges. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the SUM-SG
is defined as follows:
PoASUM(n,m, k) =
maxG∈GSUM(n,m,k) SC(G)
minG′∈G(n,m) SC(G′)
.
In the same way, the PoA of the MAX-SG is defined for the set GMAX(n,m, k) of max-swap
equilibrium graphs of n players with k-local information and m edges. The PoA of the SUM-
SG (and MAX-SG) starting from a tree is denoted by PoASUM(n, n− 1, k) (PoAMAX(n, n−
1, k), respectively).
A strategic game has the finite improvement property (FIP) if every sequence of improving
strategy changes is finite [20]. Thus, from any initial state, any sequence of finite improving
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strategy changes reaches an equilibrium. Monderer and Shapley showed that a strategic
game has the FIP if and only if it has a generalized ordinal potential function. Regarding a
swap game, a function Φ : Gn,m → R is a generalized ordinal potential function if we have
the following property for every graph G ∈ Gn,m, every unhappy player u, and every edge
swap (v, w) that makes u unhappy,
cu(G)− cu(G′) > 0 ⇒ Φ(G)− Φ(G′) > 0,
where G′ is a graph obtained by the edge swap (v, w) at u. That is, any transition in the
SUM-SG and MAX-SG satisfies the above property for the moving player.
The best response of a player u in Gt is an edge swap (v, w) that maximizes ∆u(v, w). We
call an evolution G0, G1, G2, . . . , Gi(= G0) a best response cycle when each moving player in
Gt performs a best response for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , i− 1.
We further introduce some notations for graph G = (V,E). For a set of vertices V ′ ⊆ V
the graph obtained by removing vertices in V ′ and their incident edges is denoted by G \V ′.
Additionally, for a set of edges E′ ⊆ E the graph obtained by removing edges in E′ is denoted
by G \ E′. The vertex set and the edge set of a graph G′ is denoted by V (G′) and E(G′),
respectively.
3 Convergence properties for pessimistic players
In this section, we investigate the dynamics of the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by pessimistic
players with local information. We first consider general settings where the initial graph is
not a tree and multiple players perform edge swaps simultaneously. We show that the two
games admit best response cycles. We then demonstrate that when the initial graph is a tree,
the SUM-SG and MAX-SG have the FIP and converges to an equilibrium within polynomial
number of edge swaps.
3.1 Impossibility in general settings
We first present several necessary conditions for an evolution of the SUM-SG and MAX-SG
by players with local information to reach an equilibrium. We first present the necessary
visibility for each player to change their strategies.
Theorem 1 In the SUM-SG and MAX-SG, when k ≤ 2, no player is unhappy in an arbitrary
graph. Thus, any graph is a swap equilibrium.
Proof. When k = 1, no player can perform an edge swap because VG,1(u) \NGt(u) = ∅
at any u ∈ V .
When k = 2, we first consider the SUM-SG. Assume player u is unhappy because of edge
swap (v, w) in graph G. Let G′ be the graph obtained by this edge swap. Thus, dG(u,w) = 2
and dG(u,w)− dG′(u,w) = 1. In a worst-case global graph, w has no adjacent vertex other
than those in VG,2(u) and the cost of u decreases by at most one by this edge swap. In
G′, v must be reachable from u. There exists at least one player that is in VG,2(u) and
adjacent to v, otherwise v is not reachable from u in a worst-case global graph. Hence,
dG(u, v)−dG′(u, v) = −1. Additionally, dG(u, x)−dG′(u, x) ≤ 0 for any x ∈ VG,2(u)\{v, w}.
Consequently, ∆u(v, w) ≤ 0 and u is not unhappy in G.
Next, we consider the MAX-SG. Assume player u is unhappy because of edge swap (v, w)
in graph G. Thus, dG(u,w) = 2 and w is the only player at distance 2 from u in VG,2(u)
otherwise u is not unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w) in G. Let G′ be the graph
obtained by this edge swap. In a worst-case global graph, w has no adjacent vertex other
than those in VG,2(u) and the cost of u is expected to be reduced to 1. By the same discussion
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above, v is reachable from u in G′, however dG′(u, v) = 2. Hence, the maximum distance
from u to players in VG′,2(u) is still two, thus ∆u(v, w) ≤ 0. Hence, u is not unhappy in G.
The following theorem justifies our assumption of a single edge swap in each transition.
Theorem 2 When k ≥ 3, if multiple players change their strategies simultaneously, the
SUM-SG and MAX-SG admit best response cycles.
Proof. We first consider the SUM-SG. Consider a path of four players u, v, w, and x
aligned in this order. When k ≥ 3, the two endpoint players u and x are unhappy because
of the edge swap (v, w) and (w, v), respectively. If the two players perform the edge swaps
simultaneously, the resulting graph is again a path graph, where u and x are unhappy.
The above example is also a best response cycle in the MAX-SG.
Finally, we consider dynamics of SGs starting from an arbitrary initial graph. Lenzner
presented a best response cycle for the SUM-SG by players with global information [17].
During the evolution, the distance to any player from a moving player is always less than four
and we can apply the result to the SUM-SG by pessimistic players with k-local information
for k ≥ 3. In addition, the edge swaps are also best responses in the MAX-SG. Hence, we
can also apply the result to the MAX-SG by pessimistic players with k-local information for
k ≥ 3. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 When k ≥ 3, there exists an initial graph from which the SUM-SG and MAX-
SG admit a best response cycle.
In the following, we concentrate on the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by pessimistic players
with k-local information for k ≥ 3 starting from a tree. As defined in the preliminary, a
single player changes its strategy in each transition.
3.2 Convergence from an initial tree
In this section, we show that the SUM-SG and MAX-SG have the FIP. For players with global
information, generalized ordinal potential functions for the SUM-SG [17] and MAX-SG [15]
have been proposed. We can use these generalized ordinal potential functions for pessimistic
players with local information.
Theorem 4 If G0 is a tree, any SUM-SG (G0, k) has the FIP and reaches a sum-swap
equilibrium within O(n3) edge swaps.
Proof. We show that ΦSUM = SC(G) is a generalized ordinal potential function for the
SUM-SG irrespective of the value of k. Consider a tree Gt where an arbitrary unhappy player
u performs an edge swap (v, w) that yields a new graph Gt+1. We have ∆u(v, w) > 0.
Lenzner showed that for players with global information SC(Gt) − SC(Gt+1) ≥ 2 holds
if cu(Gt) − cu(Gt+1) > 0 [17]. Since ∆u(v, w) considers the worst case graph, cu(Gt) −
cu(Gt+1) ≥ ∆u(v, w) > 0 holds. Consequently, ΦSUM is a generalized ordinal potential
function for the SUM-SG.
Lenzner also showed that when the graph is a path of n vertices, ΦSUM achieves the
maximum value of Θ(n3), and if the graph is a star of n vertices, ΦSUM achieves the minimum
value of Θ(n2). Hence, the number of edge swaps is O(n3).
We next show the FIP of the MAX-SG. Kawald and Lenzner presented a generalized
ordinal function for the MAX-SG by players with global information [15]. Their generalized
ordinal function is an n-tuple of players’ costs, where the players are sorted in the descending
order of their costs. We apply their function to the MAX-SG by pessimistic players with local
information, however, we found that their proof needs small correction. In the following, we
provide a new proof for their function.
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Consider the case where an unhappy player u performs an edge swap (v, w) in Gt and
a new graph Gt+1 is formed. Graph Gt \ {{u, v}} consists of two trees and let Gut be the
tree containing vertex u and Gvt be the tree containing vertex v. We have the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 5 [15] Any player x ∈ V (Gut ) satisfies cx(Gt) > cx(Gt+1).
Lemma 6 Any player y ∈ V (Gvt ) satisfies at least one of the following two conditions; (i)
there exists a player x ∈ V (Gut ) that satisfies cx(Gt) > cy(Gt+1) and (ii) cy(Gt) ≥ cy(Gt+1).
Proof. For an arbitrary player y ∈ V (Gvt ), let
x = arg max
x′∈V (Gut )
{dGut (u, x′)},
z = arg max
z′∈V (Gvt )
{dGvt (v, z′)}, and
z′ = arg max
z′′∈V (Gvt )
{dGvt (y, z′′)}.
We have the following three equations;
cx(Gt) = dGt(x, u) + 1 + dGt(y, z) = dGt(x, z)
cy(Gt) = max{dGt(x, y), dGt(y, z′)}
cy(Gt+1) = max{dGt+1(x, y), dGt+1(y, z′)}.
If dGt+1(x, y) > dGt+1(y, z
′), we have
cx(Gt)− cy(Gt+1) = dGt(x, z)− dGt+1(x, y)
= dGt(x, u) + 1 + dGt(v, z)
−(dGt+1(x, u) + 1 + dGt+1(w, y))
= dGt(x, u) + 1 + dGt(v, z)
−(dGt(x, u) + 1 + dGt(w, y))
= dGt(v, z)− dGt(w, y) > 0.
The third equation holds because during the transition from Gt to Gt+1 any distance between
vertices in V (Gut ) (and V (G
v
t ), respectively) does not change. The last line is bounded by 0
because
dGt+1(u, y) = 1 + dGt+1(w, y)
= 1 + dGt(w, y)
< 1 + dGt(v, z),
otherwise u was not unhappy in Gt. Thus, the first condition is satisfied.
If dGt+1(x, y) ≤ dGt+1(y, z′), we have
cy(Gt+1) = dGt+1(y, z
′)
= dGt(y, z
′)
≤ max {dGt(x, y), dGt(y, z′)}
= cy(Gt)
and the second condition is satisfied.
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We define ΦMAX(G) for a graph G as an n-tuple (cu1(G), cu2(G), . . . , cun(G)) where
cui(G) ≥ cui+1(G) for i = 1, 2, · · · , n−1. We assume that ties are broken arbitrarily. We then
consider lexicographic ordering of n-tuples. For two n-tuples C = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) and C
′ =
(c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
n) where ci, c
′
i ∈ Z for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, when ∆ = (c1−c′1, c2−c′2, . . . , cn−c′n) 6= 0
and the leftmost non-zero entry of ∆ is positive, we say C is lexicographically larger than
C ′, denoted by C >lex C ′.
Theorem 7 If G0 is a tree, a MAX-SG (G0, k) has the FIP and reaches a max-swap equi-
librium within O(n3) edge swaps.
Proof. We demonstrate that any transition from Gt to Gt+1 satisfies ΦMAX(Gt) >lex
ΦMAX(Gt+1). Let u be the moving player in Gt and x be the player with the maximum cost
in Gut . Then, in G
v
t , there may exist a player with larger cost than cx(Gt). We sort these
players in the descending order of their costs and let y1, y2, . . . , yp be the obtained sequence
of players and yp+1, . . . , yq be the remaining players in G
v
t .
We first show that any yj (1 ≤ j ≤ p) satisfies cyj (Gt) ≥ cyj (Gt+1). If the second
condition of Lemma 6 holds for all y1, y2, . . . , yp, we have the property. Otherwise, there
exists yj that does not satisfy the second condition but the first condition. However, we
have cyj (Gt) ≥ cx(Gt) and by the proof of Lemma 6, cx(Gt) > cyj (Gt+1) holds. This is a
contradiction and all yj satisfies cyj (Gt) ≥ cyj (Gt+1).
Then we consider a player v ∈ V (Gut ) ∪ {yp+1, yp+2, . . . , yq}. By Lemma 5 and Lemma 6
such player v satisfies cv(Gt+1) < cx(Gt). Consequently, we have |{v | cv(Gt) ≥ cx(Gt)}| >
|{v | cv(Gt+1) ≥ cx(Gt)}|, and ΦMAX(Gi) >lex ΦMAX(Gt+1).
We can bound the number of edge swaps in the same manner as [15].
By Theorem 4 and 7, when an initial graph is a tree, the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by
pessimistic players with local information converge to a sum-swap equilibrium and max-swap
equilibrium, respectively within O(n3) edge swaps.
4 PoA for pessimistic players
In this section, we analyze PoA of the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by pessimistic players with
local information. Alon et al. showed that for players with global information, the diameter
of a tree swap equilibrium is constant for the two cost functions, thus PoA is also constant [2].
On the other hand, our results show the clear contrast by the value of k. When k = 3, there
exists a sum-swap equilibrium of diameter Θ(n) and a max-swap equilibrium of diameter
Θ(n). Thus, PoA is Θ(n) for both games. When k ≥ 4, the diameter of any sum-swap
equilibrium is at most two and that of any max-swap equilibrium is at most three. Thus, the
PoA is bounded by a constant for both games.
In the following, we consider a path in a graph. A path P of length ` is denoted by
a sequence of vertices on it, i.e., P = v0v1 . . . v`. The set of vertices that appear on P is
denoted by V (P ) and the set of edges of P is denoted by E(P ). Given a tree G = (V,E) and
a path P = v0v1v2 . . . v` in G, consider the forest G
′ = (V,E \E(P )) and let TG,P (vi) denote
the connected component (thus, a tree) containing vi. We consider vi as the root of TG,P (vi)
when we address the depth of TG,P (vi). The following lemma provides a basic technique to
check the existence of an unhappy player.
Lemma 8 In the SUM-SG, when k = 3, a player u in a tree G is unhappy if and only if there
exists a path P = uvw that satisfies the following two conditions; (i) the depth of TG,P (v) is
at most one, and (ii) |V (TG,P (v))| < |NTG,P (w)(w)|.
Proof. We first show that u is unhappy if the two conditions hold. Assume that there
is a path P = uvw satisfying the two conditions. See Figure 1. Let G′ be the graph obtained
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Figure 1: TG,P (u), TG,P (v), and TG,P (w).
by the edge swap (v, w) at u in G. For every x ∈ V (TG,P (v)), dG′(u, x) = dG(u, x) + 1 and
for every y ∈ NTG,P (w)(w) dG′(u, y) = dG(u, y)− 1. By condition (i), u knows that the edge
swap (v, w) increases the distance to x ∈ V (TG,P (v)). By condition (ii), u knows that the
edge swap (v, w) decreases its cost by at least |NTG,P (w)(w)|. In the worst-case global graph,
w has no adjacent players other than NTG,P (w)(w). Hence,
∆u(v, w) = |NTG,P (w)(w)| − |V (TG,P (v))| > 0,
and u is unhappy because of this edge swap (v, w).
Next, we show that u is unhappy in G only if the two conditions hold. Consider the
case where for any path P = uvw, (i’) the depth of TG,P (v) is larger than one, or (ii’)
|V (TG,P (v))| ≥ |NTG,P (w)(w)| holds. We show that any player u ∈ V is not unhappy. We
check an arbitrary edge swap (v′, x′) at u. Thus, v′ ∈ NG(u) and x′ ∈ VG,3(u) \ NG(u). G
must have a path between v′ and x′, otherwise the edge swap (v′, x′) disconnects the players.
If u cannot see this path, in the worst case global graph, v′ is not reachable from u. Hence,
G contains a path uv′w′x′ or uv′x′.
If G contains a path uv′w′x′, the edge swap (v′, x′) satisfies dG(u, x′) − dG′(u, x′) = 2,
dG(u, v
′)− dG′(u, v′) = −2, and dG(u,w′)− dG′(u,w′) = 0. The worst-case global graph for
the edge swap (v′, x′) is a graph where x′ is not adjacent to any other vertex in V (G)\VG,3(u).
Thus, ∆cu(v
′, x′) ≤ 0. Hence, u is not unhappy with respect to the edge swap (v′, x′).
If G contains a path P ′ = uv′x′ and condition (i’) holds, there exist vertices v′1, v
′
2 ∈
TG,P ′(v
′) that form a path uv′v′1v
′
2. In the worst case global graph for the edge swap (v
′, x′),
v′2 has many children whose distance from u increases by one in G
′. Hence, ∆cu(v
′, x′) ≤ 0
and u is not unhappy with respect to the edge swap (v′, x′).
If G contains a path P ′ = uv′x′ and condition (ii’) holds, in the worst-case global graph for
the edge swap (v′, x′), the number of players whose distance from u decreases by one with the
edge swap (v′, x′) is |NTG,P (w)(w)| and the number of players whose distance from u increases
by one is lower bounded by |V (TG,P (v))|. Thus, ∆cu(v′, x′) ≥ |NTG,P (w)(w)|−|V (TG,P (v))| ≤
0 holds and player u is not unhappy with respect to the edge swap (v′, x′).
Consequently, u is not unhappy with respect to any edge swap.
Theorem 9 When n ≥ 13 and k ≤ 3, PoASUM(n, n− 1, k) = Θ(n).
Proof. We present a sum-swap equilibrium of diameter Θ(n). We define a tree TS(p)
with a spine path of length p as follows: For i = 1, 2, · · · , p, Hi is a tree, where ai has four
children bi, ci, di, and ei. For i = 0, p+ 1, Hi is a tree rooted at ai with three children bi, ci,
and di. TS(p) is a tree defined by
V (TS(p)) =
p+1⋃
i=0
V (Hi)
E(TS(p)) =
p+1⋃
i=0
E(Hi) ∪ {{a0, e1}, {ep, ap+1}} ∪
p−1⋃
i=1
{{ei, ei+1}}.
Figure 2 shows TS(7) as an example.
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Figure 2: TS(7)
We show that for each u ∈ V (TS(p)) (p ≥ 3), any path P = uvw does not satisfy the
two conditions of Lemma 8. First, consider the case where u is a leaf of TS(p). Then, v is ai
for some i = 0, 1, · · · , p + 1. If w is a leaf, the depth of TG,P (v) is larger than one, and the
first condition of Lemma 8 is not satisfied. If w is an internal vertex, |V (TG,P (v))| = 3 and
|NTG,P (w)(w)| = 3, and the second condition of Lemma 8 is not satisfied.
Second, consider the case where u is an internal vertex of TS(p). Then, v is also an
internal vertex otherwise we cannot find w. When the depth of TG,P (v) is larger than one,
the first condition of Lemma 8 is not satisfied. When the depth of TG,P (v) is one, v is ai for
some i = 0, 1, · · · , p+ 1 and w is a leaf. Thus, |V (TG,P (v))| = 3 and |NTG,P (w)(w)| = 1, and
the second condition of Lemma 8 is not satisfied.
Thus, every player is not unhappy and TS(p) is a sum swap equilibrium.
We then calculate the social cost in TS(p), that consists of 5p+ 8 vertices.
SC(TS(p))
=
∑
u∈V (TS(p))
∑
v∈V (TS(p))
dTS(p)(u, v)
=
p+1∑
i=0
∑
u∈V (Hi)
∑
v∈V (TS(p))
dTS(p)(u, v)
= 2
∑
u∈V (H0)∪V (H1)
∑
v∈V (TS(p))
dTS(p)(u, v)
+
p−1∑
i=2
∑
u∈V (Hi)
∑
v∈V (TS(p))
dTS(p)(u, v)
= (45p2 + 293p+ 252)
+(
25
3
p3 + 65p2 − 286
3
p− 136)
= Θ(p3)
= Θ(n3)
When n 6= 5p+ 8 for any integer p, we have the same bound by attaching extra vertices
to some ai.
Since star is a sum-swap equilibrium with the minimum social cost, the PoA of TS(p) is
Θ(n).
By TS(p), we have the following corollary.
Corollary 10 There exists a sum-swap equilibrium of diameter Θ(n) for any n ≥ 13.
We now demonstrate that when k ≥ 4, sum-swap equilibrium for pessimistic players with
k-local information achieves the same PoA as that with global information.
We first show the following lemma.
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Figure 3: Induction step of Lemma 11.
Lemma 11 In an arbitrary tree G whose diameter is larger than two, there exists a path
P = vabw that satisfies the following two conditions; (i) |VGT,P (a),2(a)| ≤ |VGT,P (b),2(b)|, and
(ii) the depth of TG,P (a) is at most two.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. There exists at least one path of length at least
three in G. We choose a path P = vabw arbitrarily. Let da and db be the depth of TG,P (a)
and TG,P (b), respectively.
(Base case.) Consider the case where max{da, db} ≤ 2. Let Prev = wbav. The two paths
P and Prev satisfies the second condition and either P or Prev satisfies the first condition.
Thus, the statement holds when max{da, db} ≤ 2.
(Induction step.) Assume the statement holds when max{da, db} ≤ d − 1 for d ≥ 3.
Consider the case where max{da, db} = d. Without loss of generality, we assume da = d ≥ 3.
Hence, there exists at least one path P ′ = aa′b′w′ in TG,P (a). See Figure 3. Let da′ and db′
be the depth of TG,P ′(a
′) and TG,P ′(b′), respectively. Clearly, da > da′ and da′ > db′ hold
and the statement holds by the induction hypothesis.
By Lemma 11, in any graph G whose diameter is larger than two there exists an unhappy
player.
Theorem 12 When G0 is a tree and k ≥ 4, any sum-swap equilibrium is a star and
PoASUM(n, n− 1, k) = 1.
Proof. Assume that there exists a sum-swap equilibrium G whose diameter is larger than
two. By Lemma 11, there exists a path P = vabw that satisfies the two conditions. Hence,
v is unhappy because
∆cv(a, b) ≥ |VTG,P (b),2(b)|+ 1− |VTG,P (a),2(a)| > 0.
This is a contradiction and G is not a sum-swap equilibrium. Hence, the diameter of a
sum-swap equilibrium is smaller than or equal to two and we have the statement.
Consequently, the “visibility” of pessimistic players has a significant effect on the PoA of
the SUM-SG. We then demonstrate that this is also the case for the MAX-SG.
Theorem 13 When n ≥ 6 and k = 3, PoAMAX(n, n− 1, k) = Θ(n).
Proof. We show that a tree shown in Figure 4 is a max-swap equilibrium.
First, consider the two endpoint vertices. Each endpoint player has one incident edge and
any edge swap involving this edge does not decrease the maximum distance to the vertices
in its view. In the worst-case global graph the player at distance two has no other vertices.
Thus, the two endpoint players are not unhappy.
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Figure 4: A max-swap equilibrium of 16 players.
Second, consider other leaves. Each leaf player has one incident edge and any edge swap
at a leaf increases the maximum distance to some vertex in its view. In the worst-case global
graph, there is a long path starting from such a vertex. Hence, the leaf players are not
unhappy.
Finally, consider inner vertices. Each inner player has three edges but it cannot remove
the edge connecting it to a leaf because such an edge swap disconnects the graph. If the
player remove an edge incident to another inner vertex and create a new edge, by the same
discussion as above, this edge swap increases the maximum distance to some vertex in its
view and the player is not unhappy.
Consequently, the graph shown in Figure 4 is a max-swap equilibrium. By adding inner
vertices (with its child), we have the similar equilibrium for any even n ≥ 6. For odd n ≥ 6,
we attach an extra player to an inner vertex and obtain a max swap equilibrium.
Since the star graph is an max-swap equilibrium with the minimum social cost, we have
PoA = Θ(n).
By the proof of Theorem 13, we have following corollary.
Corollary 14 There exists a max-swap equilibrium of diameter Θ(n) for any n ≥ 6.
We now demonstrate that when k ≥ 4, any MAX-SG by pessimistic players with k-local
information achieves the same PoA as that of players with global information. The following
lemma shows that in any tree of diameter larger than three, there is at least one unhappy
player.
Lemma 15 In any tree G whose diameter is larger than three, there exists a path P = vabcw
that satisfies the following two conditions; (i) P starts from a leaf v, and (ii) the depth of
TG,P (a) is at most one.
Proof. There exists at least one path of length at least four in G. We arbitrarily choose
a path P = vabcw that starts from some leaf v. If the depth of TG,P (a) is smaller than two,
the statement holds. If the depth of TG,P (a) is larger than one, choose a leaf v
′ in TG,P (a)
and its parent vertex, say a′. There exists at least one path P ′ = v′a′b′c′w′ and P ′ satisfies
the second condition.
Theorem 16 When G0 is a tree and k ≥ 4, the diameter of any max-swap equilibrium is at
most three and PoAMAX(n, n− 1, k) ≤ 3/2.
Proof. Assume that there exists a max-swap equilibrium G whose diameter is larger than
three. By Lemma 15, there exists a path P = vabcw such that v is a leaf and the depth of
TG,P (a) is at most one. Player v is unhappy because ∆cv(a, b) ≥ 1. This is a contradiction
and G is not a max-swap equilibrium. Thus, the diameter of any max-swap diameter is at
most three.
Because a equilibrium with the minimum cost is a star, the PoA is bounded by 3/2.
5 Swap games with non-pessimistic players
We demonstrated that when k = 2, 3, the PoA for pessimistic players is Θ(n) in the SUM-SG
and MAX-SG. In this section, we introduce less pessimistic players to obtain smaller PoA for
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these cases. We consider two types of non-pessimistic players: A player u is weakly pessimistic
if u is unhappy when there exists an edge swap (v, w) at u such that ∆cu(v, w) ≥ 0.
A player u is optimistic if its ∆cu(v, w) is defined as
∆cu(v, w) = max
H∈Gu
(cu(H)− cu(H ′)),
where H ′ is a graph obtained by an edge swap (v, w) at u in H ∈ G.
Weakly pessimistic players and optimistic players do not perform any edge swap in the
SUM-SG and MAX-SG when k = 1. Different from Theorem 1, weakly pessimistic players
change their strategies when k = 2. However, when k > 2, weakly pessimistic players cause
a cycle of edge swaps from an initial path graph.
Example 1 Let P = u0u1u2 . . . be a path of n (≥ 2k) weakly pessimistic players with k-local
information. In the SUM-SG and MAX-SG, player uk is unhappy because of the edge swap
(uk−1, u0). However after uk performs this edge swap, the graph is uk−1uk−2 . . . u0ukuk+1 . . . un
and uk is again unhappy because of the edge swap (u0, uk−1). By selecting uk forever, the
graph never reach an equilibrium.
We now consider a more restricted round robin scheduling for selecting moving players.
In a round-robin scheduling, players have a fixed ordering and at each time step a moving
player is selected according to this ordering. Consider n players u1, u2, . . . , un and let the
subscript i indicate the order of player ui. In G0 if u1 is unhappy, u1 is selected as the
moving player. Otherwise, we check u2, u3, . . . until we find an unhappy player. Thus, the
unhappy player with the smallest order, say j, is selected as a moving player. In G1 if uj+1
is unhappy, uj+1 is selected as the moving player. Otherwise, we check uj+2, uj+3, . . . until
we find an unhappy player. If un is selected in Gt, the check start with u1 in Gt+1.
However, the round-robin scheduling still admits a best response cycle.
Example 2 Consider a a path P0 = u3u1u4u2 of four weakly pessimistic players with k-local
information for k ≥ 2. For the SUM-SG, in P0, u1 is unhappy because of the edge swap
(u4, u2). When u0 performs this edge swap, a new path P1 = u3u1u2u4 is formed. In P1, u2
is unhappy because of the edge swap (u1, u3). When u2 performs this edge swap, a new path
P3 = u1u3u2u4 is formed. In P3, u3 is unhappy because of the edge swap (u2, u4). When u3
performs this edge swap, a new path P4 = u1u3u4u2 is formed. In P4, u4 is unhappy because
of the edge swap (u3, u1). When u4 performs this edge swap, a new path P5 = u3u1u4u2 = P0
is formed. This is a best response cycle in the SUM-SG and MAX-SG.
Moreover, we can show that there exists a best response cycle from an initial tree.
Theorem 17 When k ≥ 3, for weakly pessimistic players with k-local information, there
exist infinitely many trees from which the SUM-SG and MAX-SG admit best response cycles
under the round-robin scheduling.
Proof. We present an initial tree G0 for the SUM-SG by n = 2m+ 3 weakly pessimistic
players u1, u2, . . . , u2m+3 (m = 2, 3, . . .). The players are divided into two subtrees rooted at
u2m+3 and u2m+2, respectively; u2m+3 has m+ 1 leaves u1, u3, . . . , u2m+1 and u2m+2 has m
leaves u2, u4, . . . , u2m. Additionally, G0 contains an edge connecting u2m+3 and u2m+2. See
Figure 5 for n = 9.
In G0, u1 is unhappy because of the edge swap (u2m+3, u2m+2); u2m+3 and u2m+2 have m
leaves except u1. When u1 performs this edge swap, a new graph G1 is formed, where u2m+3
has m leaves and u2m+2 has m + 1 leaves. In G1, u2 is unhappy because of the edge swap
(u2m+2, u2m+3). When u2 performs this edge swap, a new graph G2 is formed, where u2m+3
has m+1 leaves and u2m+2 has m leaves. In this way, the leaves of a graph keep on changing
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Figure 5: An example of G0 for nine players. The two inner vertices are u9 with four leaves
(u1, u3, u5, and u7) and u8 with three leaves (u2, u4, and u6).
their parent under the round robin scheduling. The seesaw game continues until G2m where
u2m+3 has m leaves with even subscripts and u2m+2 has m + 1 leaves with odd subscripts.
Player u2m+2 is not unhappy in G2m; the only possibility is an edge swap (u2m+3, u2`) for
some ` ∈ {2, 4, . . . ,m}, but it increases its cost. Player u2m+3 is not unhappy in G2m with
the same reason. Player u1 is unhappy in G2m, and the leaf players start the seesaw game
again.
This cycle is also a best response cycle in the MAX-SG.
Next, we present the PoA for weakly pessimistic players with 2-local information.
Lemma 18 In the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by weakly pessimistic players with 2-local infor-
mation, a player u is unhappy if and only if there is a path uvw where the degree of v is
two.
Proof. We first consider the SUM-SG. If there is a path uvw in G such that the degree
of v is two, u is unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w). In the worst-case global graph,
w does not have any adjacent player except v and the cost decreases by one. On the other
hand, the edge swap (v, w) increases the distance between u and v by one.
If u is unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w) in G, dG(u, v) = 1 and dG(u,w) = 2.
Let G′ be the graph obtained by the edge swap (v, w) at u in G. Graph G′ must contain a
path between v and w otherwise players are disconnected. Additionally, v is adjacent to w in
G otherwise in a worst case global graph v is not reachable from u. If v has other adjacent
vertices than u and w, the edge swap (v, w) increases the cost of u by at lease two while the
edge swap decreases the cost of u by at least one. Hence, the degree of v must be two in G.
Consequently, we have the statement.
Then we consider the MAX-SG. If there is a path uvw where the degree of v is two, u is
unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w). If u is unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w),
then the degree of v is two in G, otherwise the edge swap increases the cost of u by at least
one. Consequently, we have the statement.
By Lemma 18, a graph is a swap equilibrium if it does not have any vertex of degree
two. The graph shown in Figure 4 is a swap equilibrium with diameter Θ(n). We have the
following theorem.
Theorem 19 For weakly pessimistic players with 2-local information, when n ≥ 4, PoASUM(n, n−
1, 2) = Θ(n) and PoAMAX(n, n− 1, 2) = Θ(n).
We then present the PoA of the SUM-SG by weakly pessimistic players with 3-local
information.
Theorem 20 For weakly pessimistic players with 3-local information, when n ≥ 16, PoASUM(n, n−
1, 3) = Θ(n).
Proof. We present a sum-swap equilibrium in the same manner as Theorem 9. For
i = 1, 2, · · · , p, H ′i is a tree in which ai has five children bi, ci, di, ei, and fi. For i = 0, p+ 1,
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Figure 6: TS′(7)
H ′i is a tree rooted at ai with four children bi, ci, di, and ei. Then TS
′(p) is is a tree defined
by
V (TS(p)) =
p+1⋃
i=0
V (Hi)
E(TS(p)) =
p+1⋃
i=0
E(Hi) ∪ {{a0, f1}, {fp, ap+1}} ∪
p−1⋃
i=1
{{fi, fi+1}}.
Figure 6 shows TS′(7) as an example.
We omit the detailed proof because it easy to check whether every player is unhappy or
not in TS′(p).
By Theorem 12, we have the following theorem because when a pessimistic player u is
unhappy in graph G, u is unhappy in G when u is a weakly pessimistic player.
Theorem 21 When k ≥ 4, for weakly pessimistic players with k-local information, the di-
ameter of a sum-swap equilibrium is at most two and PoASUM(n, n− 1, k) = 1.
On the other hand, the diameter of any max-swap equilibrium is smaller than three for
weakly pessimistic players with 3-local information.
Theorem 22 When k ≥ 3, for weakly pessimistic players with k-local information, the di-
ameter of a max-swap equilibrium is at most two and PoAMAX(n, n− 1, k) = 1.
Proof. Assume that there exists a max-swap equilibrium G whose diameter is larger than
two. Then, there exists a path P = uvwx in G that starts from a leaf u.
If the depth of TG,P (v) is smaller than two, then u is unhappy because of the edge swap
(v, w) that keeps the maximum distance to vertices in its view unchanged.
If the depth of TG,P (v) is larger than one, then we can find a path P
′ = u′v′w′x′ such
that u′ is a leaf and the depth of TG,P ′(v′) is at most one. More specifically, we choose an
arbitrary leaf u′ with the largest depth in TG,P (v). There exists a path whose length is larger
than three starting from u′ because there exists a path from u′ to v and a path vwx. Then
the depth of TG,P ′(v
′) is at most one. If the depth of TG,P ′(v′) is zero, u′ is unhappy as
mentioned above. If the depth of TG,P ′(v
′) is one, u′ is unhappy because of the edge swap
(v′, w′) that keeps the maximum distance to any vertex in its view unchanged. Hence, G is
not a max-swap equilibrium.
We now consider graph G′ whose diameter is two, i.e., G′ is a star. The unique inner
vertex player, say c, is not unhappy because it cannot perform any edge swap since V (G) \
NG(c)∪{c} = ∅. Any leaf player is not unhappy because any edge swap changes its cost from
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two to three. Thus, an arbitrary star graph is a max-swap equilibrium and the minimum
social cost of the MAX-SG is achieved by a star graph. Thus, PoA(n, n− 1, k) = 1 for k ≥ 3.
Finally, we consider optimistic players. An optimistic player u with k-local information
expects that a player at distance k has a long path that u cannot observe. Thus, u always
perform an edge swap to create an edge connecting itself to another player at distance k if
any.
Lemma 23 For optimistic players with k-local information, the diameter of any swap equi-
librium is smaller than k.
Consequently, in a sum-swap equilibrium and a max-swap equilibrium, all optimistic
players can observe the entire graph. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 24 For optimistic players with k-local information, PoASUM(n, n− 1, k) = 1 and
PoAMAX(n, n− 1, k) < 3/2.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced swap games with k-local information and investigated their
dynamics and PoA. First, we showed that when k ≥ 4, starting from a tree, the SUM-
SG and MAX-SG by pessimistic players with k-local information promise convergence to
an equilibrium with constant PoA. In other words, in a distributed environment, rational
participants can construct a tree of small diameter without global information.
We then introduced weakly pessimistic players to obtain a tree equilibrium with small
PoA for k ≤ 3. When k = 3, the MAX-SG achieves a constant PoA, at the cost of best
response cycles. Thus, relaxing pessimism does not promise distributed graph construction.
Finally, we introduced optimistic players and presented the constant PoA of the SUM-SG
and MAX-SG for any value of k.
There are many interesting future directions. One is a better upper bound and a lower
bound of the number of edge swaps during convergence. Based on [15, 17], we put our basis
on the potential function for a game, however we do not know whether our upper bound is
tight or not. The dynamics of non-pessimistic players is also an open problem.
Although games with imperfect information have been investigated in game theory, to
the best of our knowledge, there are few games where each player knows the existence of
only a part of players. We hope games in this form open up new vistas for game theory and
distributed computing.
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